In worldwide practice, it is customary to determine a country’s economic potential (that fixes its place in the world) through a number of macro-indicators, the most common of which are: GDP, GNP, or GNI (an aggregate economic indicator); per capita GDP (a relative indicator of the standard of living); GDP growth rate (dynamics of the economy’s development); the population’s life expectancy (a reflection of several indicators, including standard of living, health care, infant mortality, quality of life, etc.); military expenditures (the degree of involvement in the struggle for geostrategic dominance); and foreign trade (the degree of involvement in the world economy).
As a nod to tradition, I will continue to include the military expenditures indicator, which belongs in the geostrategic sphere, in the list macro-indicators on the Human Development Index (HDI).
Given this book’s content, the indicators mentioned above make sense only through a comparative analysis. Since Russia’s leaders keep proclaiming that Russia is a great power, we shall compare all its macro-indicators to those of the great powers; by default, these include the USA, Germany, the UK, France, Japan, and China. Of the European states, I will keep here only Germany as the mightiest economic power.
* * *
A few words are in order about statistics. Forget about statistics being “lies.” Let me note that even when they do “lie,” statistics still work for political purposes in the same way as do deliberately distorted assessments of the goals or conduct of particular states in the world arena. However, even among the “believers” in statistics, many are confused, for example, by the “obvious” incongruities in GDP estimates. Indeed, one often reads that, say, Russia’s GDP in 1996 was $360 billion, while another material contains the figure $990 billion; it would seem that one of the authors is lying. Both figures are correct. It is just that in the first case, the currency exchange rate was used, while in the second case, GDP was calculated using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). The exchange-rate-based indicator is considered dependent on circumstances (exchange rates can be deliberately set too high or too low) and is, therefore, less objective.
However, the matter is not that simple. The choice of indicator depends on the topic of research. The PPP indicator gives a more realistic picture when comparing the levels and states of economies between developed and developing countries; i.e., it is more suited for comparisons of social-economic indicators. The exchange-rate indicator is better suited for comparing “places” and especially “roles,” since in the sphere of international relations intra-country differences do not matter. I have decided to include all three indicators wherever possible: GNP, GDP at the exchange rate, and GDP at PPP. Also, keep in mind that different GNP figures are sometimes given for the same year. This depends on the base year chosen for the U.S. dollar. For example, the GNP figure for 2000 can be given at current prices, or it can be given in 1990 prices. The base year is usually specified in tables.
The sources I used here are the materials of the Russian State Committee for Statistics (“Goskomstat”). The materials I used for comparisons come mostly from international organizations, such as the IMF (in the area of foreign trade), the World Bank, and the United Nations. Since different methods are used to this day for calculating a particular macro-indicator (even in the area of foreign trade), some resulting estimates may differ from each other. Still, the differences are not that important when speaking of the general picture.
In any case, statistics provide a more objective picture of Russia’s place and role than empty, unsubstantiated claims.
Russia’s Place in the World at the beginning of the 20th Century
For subsequent comparisons, it would be useful to determine Russia’s place in the world at the beginning of the 20th century. I wrote a whole book on that topic and now will reproduce here, in abridged form, certain results from that analysis. Note that at the beginning of the 20th century, the discipline of comparative statistics did not yet exist; therefore, there was no universally accepted methodology for comparisons. Relatively few macro-indicators were used for comparisons at that time, and Russia was usually absent from summary tables. This was not just due to the poor statistical base in Russia itself. V. A. Melyantsev, a contemporary specialist in comparative analysis, maintains that “the problems of Russia’s economic development are so complex and, paradoxical as it may seem, so poorly worked out in the aspect of practical measurements of growth dynamics, that they require a number of special research projects.”[1]
I became convinced of the truth of this statement from my own experience after shoveling through a pile of statistical materials from that period. However, I did manage to compile some useful figures from Western and Soviet-Russian sources. By the way, I took a substantial amount of data from Lenin’s Notebooks on Imperialism. This work contains a complete summary of statistical facts from all the leading countries of the world, some of which Lenin later used in his work, Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916). Even though the body of statistical materials I compiled is still not complete, I trust that it will help answer questions that interest many people.
Relying on the indicators mentioned above, let us look at their actual values at the beginning of the 20th century. I must specify that the GDP indicator was not in use in those times; instead, the volume of industrial production was used.
The volume of industrial production. The following table gives a certain idea of Russia’s place among the principal states of Europe together with the USA as concerns the main industries of that era.
The output of Main Industrial Products in 1913
(Annual Average Data)
Sources: J.A.S. Grenville, A History of the World in the 20th Century (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1994): 16, 24-25, 33, 53-54. The data on the USA and the line on railroads come from V. I. Lenin, Notebooks on Imperialism, 28: 462-463, 468.
In the aggregate volume of industrial production, Russia occupied fifth place in the world behind the USA, Germany, Great Britain, and France. The gap separating Russia from the leading powers was quite substantial. Kenwood and Lougheed estimate that in 1913, Russia accounted for just 4.4 percent of the world’s industrial production, while the USA accounted for 35.8 percent, Germany for 14.3 percent, Great Britain for 14.1 percent, and France, seven percent. Russia was at that time ahead of Japan, whose share was just 1.2 percent.[2]
Per capita production. On this count, Russia’s situation was much worse. According to Michael Kort’s estimates, per capita income in Russia was falling behind “its European competitors.” “In the fifty years between 1860 and 1910, Russia was unable to overtake even Spain or Italy, much less the real industrial powers, in that vital measure of industrial progress.”[3] He also calculated that “In 1900, Russia’s per capita production had been one-eighth that of the United States and one-sixth that of Germany; on the eve of the war those figures were one-eleventh and one-eighth, respectively. In 1913, Russia produced only one-tenth as much coal and barely half as much steel as Great Britain, a country with less than half Russia's population. Over half of the empire's industrial equipment still had to be imported.”[4]
Applying W. A. Lewis’s particular method utilizing the U.S. industrial output as the base for comparisons at 100 units, it turns out that Russia’s per capita output in 1917 amounted to only nine units; that is, Russia was in 22nd place in the world, behind its vassal states Finland (27 units) and Poland (13 units), and behind even such states as Chili and Argentina. Japan was at six units at the time.[5]
Military potential. In this area, Russia was near the top of the list. Its aggregate military budget was second only to that of Great Britain; it was number one in the number of ground troops and fourth in navy size (behind Great Britain, the USA, and France).
Foreign trade. Russia was number six in the world in the volume of foreign trade. Its share of the world trade was about four percent in 1913.
Education. The level of education is an enormously important indicator of a nation’s potential. On this topic, there has been and continues to be much speculation about Tsarist Russia; in particular, it is claimed that almost all peasants were literate under the last Tsar. The situation was different, though one has to admit certain progress in this regard after 1910. In 1900, outlays on education amounted to 2.1 percent of the state budget, while in 1804, their share was 2.6 percent. The Brockhaus and Efron Encyclopedia contains comparative figures for the end of the 19th century, showing that in 1897, two percent of Russia’s budget was spent on education. Per capita expenditures on education were 2.84 rubles in England, 2.11 rubles in France, 1.89 rubles in Prussia, 0.64 rubles in Austria, 0.55 rubles in Hungary, and 0.21 rubles in Russia.[6]
In 1896, Russia (not counting Finland) had 52 institutions of higher education. In 1893-94, there were 25,166 students enrolled therein; only four percent were women. The number of elementary school students was 3,801,133 in a country whose population was 126,369,000 people. The Encyclopedia states: “On the basis of these data, the elementary education indicator for Russia equaled three.” For the USA, this indicator equaled 21.[7]
In 1913, education expenditures started to grow, reaching 4.6 percent of the budget. According to modern corrected data, by 1900 only about 30 percent of Russia’s adult population was literate.[8] At the same time, in the principal states of Europe and North America, 90 percent of the population was literate.
Population mortality and life expectancy. Average life expectancy is the ultimate indicator of a society’s development level. At the end of the 19th century, mortality in Russia was 35 people per 1,000; in Scandinavian countries, 17; in England, 19; in France, 22; and in Germany, 24. In Russia, only 550 of every 1,000 children born lived to the age of five; in Western Europe, over 700.
In 1893-95, in European Russia, 555 out of 100,000 died of acutely infectious diseases; in Austria (second place), 350; in Belgium, 244; in Ireland, 102.5. Russia had only 155 physicians per one million people; Norway and Austria had 275; England had 578.[9]
On the whole, the average life expectancy in 1913 was 52 years in Great Britain, 51 in Japan, 50 in France, 50 in the USA, 49 in Germany, 47 in Italy, 30 in China, and 23 in India.[10] In Russia, it was 30.5 years.[11] Consider that in 1896-1897, the average life expectancy in Russia was 32 years (31 for men, 33 for women).[12] That is, average life expectancy decreased over the years of Russia’s capitalization. Curiously enough, the same thing is happening today. Why is that?
Data on emigration are useful, too, showing that as capitalism developed in Russia, emigration also grew. Russian authorities did not keep correct or complete statistics. However, we have records for certain periods. In 1861-1870, 3,050 people emigrated annually to the USA; in 1887-1891, 55,524 people; in 1892-1896, 52,969 people; and in 1897, 29,981 people left. So it turns out that in the period 1887-1897, the number of emigrants was 19 times greater than in 1861-1870.[13]
The aggregate result is that Russia’s nominal economic mass was fifth biggest in the world.
The Years of Soviet Power: The Transformation into a Superpower
It is complicated to perform a comparative analysis of the USSR’s place in the world between 1917 and the end of World War II, primarily because of the untrustworthy nature of Soviet statistical data from those years. This problem produced heated debates among economists who started (especially after 1991) to recalculate the USSR’s economic development for those years. V. Kudrov’s voluminous article in which he quotes alternative estimates, primarily those prepared in the bowels of the CIA, is an example.[14] Despite all these arguments, no one denies the fact that the Soviet economy made a colossal jump before World War II.
Kenwood and Lougheed relied on League of Nations statistics, quoting the following data in their book: Taking 1913 as 100, the world index of manufacturing activity averaged 185 in the years 1936-38, where the index for the United States stood at 167; Germany, 138; Britain, 122; and France at 118, all well below the world average. In contrast, many new countries had industrialized at an enormous pace: The Soviet Union's index rose to 774, Japan’s to 529, Finland’s to 289, India’s to 230, and Sweden’s to 223. (170) In other words, the USSR developed faster than any other country in the world.
Percentage Distribution of the World's Manufacturing Production, 1913-38
This table shows that in 1926-29, the USSR’s share of the world’s manufacturing production was 0.1 percent lower than Russia’s share in 1913. However, over the next ten years, it grew explosively. For the first time in its thousand-year history, the Russian state acquired the status of the world’s second-biggest industrial power.
After World War II, the Soviet Union’s economic potential grew still more, earning it the status of the world’s other superpower. See the following table:
Russia’s Economic Weight Compared to Other Leading Powers in 1985
Sources: Bruce Russett, Harvey Starr, World Politics: The Menu for Choice, (New York: W. H. Freeman & Company, 1989), (Appendix B); Military Spending: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers - WMEAT-95 (Washington: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, April 1996); Foreign Trade - WTO. Merchandise Trade Section, Statistics Division (July 1999); available on the Internet.
Though the USSR’s economic potential was still almost three times smaller than America’s, even American scholars believed from statistical calculations that the Soviet Union would be closing the gap inevitably. For example, the well-known futurologists, Kahn and Wiener, forecasted that if U.S. GNP was to grow at 5.5 percent annually and the Soviet GNP at seven percent, by 2000 the gap would be much reduced, and by 2020 the USSR would almost catch up with the USA.[15] Those two scholars could not imagine that the USSR would shortly collapse, and its GNP would shrink to the size of Australia’s or even Sweden’s.
Apart from the growth of economic might, one should pay attention to the important indicator of average life expectancy. In Russia, it was 31 years for men and 33 years for women in 1896-97; 30.5 years in 1913; and by 1970-71, it reached 63 years for men and 74 years for women. Thus, in over little more than 50 years of Soviet power, this indicator more than doubled, which is unprecedented in world history.
The following table shows that starting from 1985, i.e., the first year of ill-advised reformer Mikhail Gorbachev’s regime, the Soviet Union’s indicators started falling behind those of the USA, and the gap started growing. However, even in 1991, hardly anyone expected the collapse to be so shattering that the Russian state would drop from 2nd place to the 19th by the end of the century.
Economic Weight of the USA and the USSR Compared
Note: 1985 GNP is given in 1982 prices.
Sources: For 1980: What about Russians and Nuclear War? (New York: Pocket Books, 1983), 231. For 1985 and 1991: Statistical Abstracts of the United States (1994); International Trade Statistics (New York, 1989); IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (1995). USSR GNP growth in 1985 is given according to CIA statistics.
* Soviet statistics.
So, by the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union held second place in the world in GNP and in manufacturing production (its share of the latter was about 20 percent); third place in the number of school students; second place in the number of higher-school students; and first place in the number of physicians per 10,000 of the population. Average life expectancy more than doubled over the years of Soviet power. In the military sphere, “equal-weight strategic parity” was achieved between the USSR and the USA, between the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO. The USSR’s share of the world’s exports was 4.45 percent, and of imports, 4.13 percent (1985). By 1990, these shares had dropped to 1.7 percent for exports and 1.9 percent for imports.
Thus, the Soviet Union was a regional “pole” in the Eurasian geographic space, with a GNP more than double that of second-place (West) Germany. At the same time, the USA remained the world “pole” on the global level, with a GDP more than double that of either the USSR or Japan.
The End of the 20th Century: Russia at the Bottom
So much has been written about the collapse of Russia’s economy over the years of capitalization, there is no point in repeating it here. The analysis of the causes of this collapse is not among the topics of this book. In this section, we will have a look at the same points of comparison used to determine Russia’s place in the world at the start of this century.
Russia’s Socio-economic Performance Against the Background
of the World’s Leading Powers, 2000
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2002 (Washington, DC, 2002); WTO, International trade statistics 2001 (2001); The Human Development Report, 2002 (UNDP, 2002).
Russia’s GNI at the end of the 20th century. The table above shows that by 2000, Russia ranked 19th in the world in GNI size and 114th in per capita GNI. The picture is not much changed when we use PPP for the per capita indicator; the rank changes from 114th to 79th. I remind you that in 1913, Russia ranked fifth in the world in industrial production.
In recent years, among the great powers, Russia was the only one going to ruin instead of continuing to develop. (In the past decade, its manufacturing production volume fell by more than 50 percent.) The average annual GDP drop was 6.1 percent. In other words, Russia left the rank of great powers and regressed by a century or two.
Military potential. Considering only defense spending, SIPRI (2002) data show that, on this indicator, Russia ranked only behind the USA.[16] Russia does keep a nuclear potential formally at parity with that of the USA. This parity is most likely a fiction since a military budget of only $5.0 billion (official Russian budget data for 2000) makes it impossible for Russia to maintain the country’s nuclear posture at the required level. The level of combat-preparedness and qualification of the armed forces is evidenced by the simple fact that, in two years, they still have not managed to finish the war in Chechnya, i.e., destroy some “bandit groups.” The possession of a strategic nuclear potential puts Russia in the rank of great powers only on a formal basis.
Education and science. In 1917, a worker in Russia had only one year of education on average; in 1941, four years; in 1960, six years; and in 1990, 10.5 years (compared to 14 years in the USA). In 1990, the USSR had 5.2 million students in universities and colleges; the USA had about 13.8 million.[17] By 1999, the number in Russia dropped to four million, with almost half of the student population taking evening classes, correspondence courses, or attending private self-styled “academies” and “universities” where the quality of education is close to zero.
The financial aspect of education: Between 1991 and 1999, education spending decreased by 48 percent overall and by 38 percent per student. In 1999 and 2000, education spending amounted to 3.6 percent and 3.75 percent, respectively, of the federal budget, almost like in America; however, these percentages translate to just $1 billion and $0.97 billion, respectively.[18] Russian statistics provide no details about the use of this money, or whether any additional channels existed for financing education. Therefore, the figures quoted above should probably be regarded as “final” ones without any additions. (In reality, it is not so, but that is a separate topic.)
Here is another aspect of the same phenomenon: According to data from international sources, the USSR spent about 2.2 percent of its GNP on the development of science and technology in 1985; in 1999 and 2000, this figure was just 0.3 percent, or $500 million.
According to official data, between 1989 and 1999, R&D spending in Russia grew from 10.9 billion rubles to 47.3 billion rubles when measured at current prices, but in constant prices, it fell by a factor of 3.3. According to preliminary data, in 1999 it did not exceed 30 percent of the 1989 level. [19]
According to Russian newspapers’ data, about one-third of all R&D personnel have left their jobs, and academic science has lost about half its research fellows. [20] The most talented researchers have left Russia; their number is at least 180,000 to 250,000 in the spheres of science, scientific services, and medicine.[21]
Demographic situation. For the first time after World War II, the country's population shrank in 1993 by 300,000 people; in 1994, it shrank by a further 920,000; in 1995, by 164,200; and in 1996, by 475,000. In that year, the number of deaths exceeded the number of births by 60 percent.[22] The most tragic statistic is the drop in life expectancy for men. Let me quote Gundarev, a leading Russian expert on this problem, who heads a laboratory at the State Institute of Prophylactic Medicine and is the author of the book, Why People Die in Russia and How Are We to Survive? In his interview with the newspaper, Argumenty i facty, he said: “In order to picture the scale of our current demographic disaster, let us compare it, for example, to the 1930s—that dark period of our history with its collectivization and subsequent famine, mass exiles, and repressions. The country lost 15 million people then (those who died of the mentioned causes and those who were never born for the same causes). That is, additional annual mortality was 890 people per 100,000. In Russia, over the last four years, this indicator (excess mortality plus drop in births) amounted to 1,150(!) people annually per 100,000.”[23] As one English economist put it, “It is hard to find a historical precedent for such mortality in a time of no war and no natural disasters.”[24] Nezavisimaya Gazeta comes to the following conclusion: “It turns out that in their annual destruction of human potential, the current Russian reforms exceed the destructive might of Stalin’s regime by a factor of two; they are comparable to World War I, and only Hitler’s invasion brought bigger loss of life.”[25] It follows that the current democratic regime is many times more “totalitarian” than Stalin’s totalitarian regime.
In other words, Russia is exhibiting the trend of a nation dying out. This thesis is confirmed by many other figures. Russia ranks first in Europe in infant mortality. According to specialists’ estimates, the number of children born sick is 2.3 times greater now than five years ago. Data from the Ministry of Health Care indicate that 80 percent of all schoolchildren are affected by some illness. Alcoholism is a well-known scourge in Russia; unfortunately, the “reforms” have further exacerbated this problem. The American magazine, U.S. News & World Report, informed readers that the USSR had 4.5 million registered alcoholics in 1988; Russia had six million by 1996.[26] This problem partly accounts for Russia’s unique feature, i.e., the world’s most significant gap between life expectancies for men and woman—12.4 years in 1999.
The shrinking of the population is due to a large degree to environmental catastrophe in Russia; awareness of this catastrophe is low both in the country itself and in the West. The Ministry for Protection of the Environment and Natural Resources prepared a report in which it says that water is now undrinkable in about 70 percent of Russia’s rivers and lakes, due to decades of careless industrial and agricultural practices. About 80 percent of the water supply system does not meet the standards of hygiene, and 40 percent of equipment in this system is entirely obsolete. Up to one-third of all dairy products sold in Moscow are infected by fecal bacilli. The content of sulfurous gas in Moscow’s air is twice as high as in New York and eight times higher than in Paris. Thirty percent of all food products in Moscow contain poisonous chemicals in health-endangering quantities. The maximum permissible norms for absorption of radioactive substances into the body, approved by the Ministry of Health Care of the USSR and in effect to this day, are ten times higher than the norms approved in the West. The annual “per capita consumption” of hazardous substances in Russia is about 400 kg.
The World Health Organization forecasts that Russia’s population will drop to 130-135 million by 2015. According to WHO data, Russia currently ranks 91st in the world in life expectancy, and 20 years from now, it should drop to 125th place (among 188 states). In 1999 Russia ranked 130th in health care levels. Nicolas Eberstadt, a specialist on population issues, wrote an article sarcastically titled Russia: Too Sick to Matter? in which he quotes data about the catastrophic demographic situation there. He concludes with a symptomatic phrase: “It looks like Russia will be bedridden for many, many years.”[27]
Human Development Index—HDI. As I mentioned already, the HDI has been in use since 1990. This indicator is an aggregate of average life expectancy, the average education level of the adult population plus aggregate indicators of schooling, and per capita income in U.S. dollars corrected to account for PPP.
By this index, the table below shows that Russia ranked 62nd [28] in 1998 among 174 states; it was behind not only all the developed states, but even behind Cuba and Belarus (56th and 57th respectively), as well as a number of Latin American, Asian and African countries. In 1995, Russia ranked 57th. In 1990, the Soviet Union (in its worst year) ranked 33rd by this same indicator.[29] Thus, in just eight years, almost 30 states managed to overtake post-reform Russia.
Foreign trade. In 1913, Russia's share of the world trade was between four and six percent (6th place in the world). In 2000, this share dropped to 1.2 percent: 1.7 percent for exports (17th place) and 0.7 percent for imports (28th place).[30] The following table helps us draw important conclusions.
Shares of Regions and Individual Countries in the Exports and Imports of Russia/USSR/Russian Federation
Calculated using data from the following sources: For 1913, P. A. Khromov. Russia’s Economic Development in the XIX-XX Centuries. 1800-1917 (М., 1950), 490-493; IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbooks (DOTS), 1984, 1997, 2001.
First, the dynamics of the regional and countrywide share of Russia’s aggregate foreign trade between 1913 and 2000 show that even though Europe’s importance decreased by the end of the century, it remains Russia’s primary trading partner. Germany’s share alone is higher than the share of all of East Asia (including Japan and China). This means there is no objective ground for all the talk, conducted throughout the century and especially today by the “APR”-babblers, about Russia’s need to reorient itself more actively toward the “APR”. Russia was—and still is—oriented toward Europe.
Second, one can see a regularity in the low importance to Russian trade of Africa, Latin America, South Asia, the Near and Middle East, not to mention Australia and Oceania. Occasionally, some of these regions increased in importance, due to either temporary market conditions or massive sales of weapons, but not to any real demand that usually stems from objective economic interests.
Third, the dramatic increase in the USA’s share of Russia’s foreign trade in the years of the country’s capitalization is also due more to political considerations than to economic interests. America’s share can be expected to decrease in the future due to the inevitable deterioration in the general climate of American-Russian relations.
Fourth, the following table shows Russia’s extremely insignificant share of the great powers’ foreign trade. In a trade with other countries of the world, this share is even smaller. In other words, Russia, on the whole, does not influence the state of the world trade, except for three items—oil, gas, and weapons. Outside the CIS, Russia exerts no noticeable influence on the world’s trade-economic situation.
Russia's Share of Selected Countries’ Exports and Imports
Calculated from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbooks (DOTS), 1997, 2001.
Fifth, Russia is not a member of any integration zones or fields and does not participate in globalization. Instead, it is a passive object of internationalization. This situation reflects its weak economic mass.
Sixth, Russia has no real chances of breaking into the ranks of the world’s major trading powers, either in the near- or middle-term perspective. Faith in Russia’s potential based on its truly enormous natural resources is perfectly groundless since natural resources do not define a state’s place in the world.
* * *
Over the past hundred years, Russia’s place—and accordingly its status in the world—experienced some dramatic leaps. Before 1917, Russia ranked fifth in the world, with the status of a regional power; between 1917 and 1985, it ranked second, having the status of a superpower; after 1991, it dropped to 19th place and acquired the status of a state that matters only in the CIS geographic space.
Russia was thrown back not only when compared to the period of the USSR’s existence, but also when compared to the Tsarist period of the early 20th century. This phenomenon is unique in that this throwback was not due to wars or natural disasters, but happened in peacetime.
It is evident that Russia’s current status is not natural for a country that has been for many centuries a structure-forming element in the framework of international relations. The question of whether it has the actual potential for reclaiming great power status is a topic for another book.
[1] V. A. Mel’yanzev, East and West in the second millennium: economy, history and the present, (M.: Moskovskyi universitet, 1996), 228.
[2] A.G. Kenwood, A.L. Lougheed, The Growth of International Economy: 1820-1990 (London: Routledge, 1992): 171.
[3] Michael Kort, The Soviet Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the USSR (New York, 1993), 79.
[4] Ibid., 80.
[5] Kenwood, Lougheed, 128.
[6] Russia: Encyclopedia, 206.
[7] Ibid., 400.
[8] Nezavisimaya gazeta, April 1, 1999.
[9] Russia: Encyclopedia, 224-225.
[10] Mel’yanzev, 145.
[11] Nezavisimaya gazeta, ibid.
[12] Goskomstat Rossii (M., 1997).
[13] Russia: Encyclopedia, 105.
[14] V. Kudrov, “Soviet economic growth: official data and alternative estimates,” Voprosyi ekonomiki, No. 10 (1995).
[15] Herman Kahn, Anthony Wiener, The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years (New York: Macmillan Company, 1967), 159.
[16] SIPRI Yearbook 2002. Internet. In this case, Russian military expenditure as an exception was converted by use of the PPP conversion factor.
[17] Data from foreign sources. See Pravda, 20 September 1994.
[18] Goskomstat Rossii for 1999 and 2000; Nezavisimaya gazeta, February 16, 2000.
[19] Ekonomika i zhizn’, April 21, 2000.
[20] According to A. Volsky’s data, since 1991, Russian research institutes have lost between 40 percent and 70 percent of their personnel, and their funding shrank by a factor of 15. See Rossiiskaya gazeta, January 15, 1997.
[21] NG Nauka, January 19, 2000.
[22] Other sources give these figures for population decreases: 220,000 people in 1992, 750,000 in 1993, 920,000 in 1994, 785,000 in 1995. See Pravda, July 10, 1996.
[23] Argumenty i fakty, No. 8 (February 1996).
[24] The Economist, July 9, 1994, 50.
[25] Quote from: Obzory SMI Rossii, 2 June 1997; Internet.
[26] U.S. News & World Report, 15 April, 1996; Internet.
[27] Nicolas Eberstadt, “Russia: Too Sick to Matter?” Policy Review, No. 95 (June and July 1999); Internet.
[28] UN DP (2000), Human Development Report 2000: Human Rights and Human Development.
[29] Literaturnaya gazeta, July 23, 1996.
[30] WTO, International Trade Statistics 2001 (2001).
Russia’s Place in the Geoeconomic Space
