Euphoria
I track the Georgian-Russian conflict through American, English and Russian mass media. Naturally, the Anglo-Saxons and the Russians interpret the same events entirely differently. It is practically impossible to understand who is in the right and who is in the wrong. One thing only is obvious: the West is on Georgia’s side, Russia is on its own side.
Let us examine Russia’s reaction. The present conflict has been the main topic for all television channels and for all newspapers for almost three weeks now in August 2008. The general mood of the mass media and the people is that of jubilation, of victory against the backdrop of a tragedy. One gets the impression that they have just won World War IV. As a philistine, I am with my people: finally, Russia is not just talking about its greatness but has demonstrated it in action. It liberated South Ossetia from Georgian invaders and recognized the independence of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, despite the outcry in the West. The feeling of pride is surging: finally, Russia has “shown Kuzma’s mother” to the West (=given the West his gruel)! The patriot’s soul is filled with joy – how can it be not? Even all of Russia’s opposition forces supported the Kremlin’s actions! However, we should have taken advantage of the situation and taken Tbilisi, removed their paranoid President and enthroned “our own son of a bitch” in his stead – the same thing that the Americans did in Iraq. What’s the difference? Georgia’s territorial integrity had been violated already in South Ossetia which is part of Georgia’s territory; therefore the troops could have marched right on – and indeed they did. It is a very short distance from Gori to Tbilisi, but for some reason, the troops stopped and then withdrew to South Ossetia. What’s the matter – they got scared of the West?
By the way: back in 1997-1998 (I was studying problems of the Caspian Sea region back then), I tried on one occasion to persuade a group of military top brass (the senior one was a Colonel General) that Georgia will join NATO inevitably. The military officials received my arguments then as a madman’s rant. I attempted to get my reasoning published in the Army newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda, but my article was nixed. I did, however, managed to get it into one of the provincial newspapers (Astrakhanskiye Izvestiya, 22 October 1998) and then included it in one of my books. This is what I said there: “It is to be expected that in the near future the USA will place its warships in the Black Sea on a permanent basis with the agreement of Turkey and Georgia, and will also station a squadron of military transport airplanes in one of Georgia’s airfields. These will be the first notices of Georgia’s intent to be one of the first countries in the Caucasus region to seek NATO membership.” (Oleg Arin. Russia on the Roadside of the World. Moscow, Linor, 1999, p.156).
I’m quoting myself not to demonstrate my perspicacity, but demonstrating the shortsightedness of the military leaders who hoped at that time for some kind of “normal” relations with Georgia. By the way, even today certain politicians call for preserving “friendly” relations with the Georgian people, i.e., a “people” that elected a President with fascist ways. (In general, one should be very careful when using the term “people.”)
What I said here about Georgia applies fully to Ukraine as well. In the current historical conditions Ukraine is turning – if indeed it hasn’t turned already – into a strategic enemy of Russia. Hoping for “good neighborly” relations with it amounts to fooling oneself with more illusions. To get rid of such illusions, it suffices to recall the history of Ukrainian-Russian relations. At every opportunity (right after Bogdan Khmelnitsky, starting with his son Yuri Khmelnitsky) Ukraine betrayed Russia’s interests, siding now with the Turks, now with the Crimean Tartars, now with the Poles. Ukraine’s typical anti-Russian idols include Mazepa, Petlyura, and Bandera. Now it has new masters who will inevitably drag it into NATO. Therefore it is necessary to seize Crimea without delay and without explaining anything to anyone; just take what is ours – and that will be all. Even though the outcry in the West will be even shriller than in the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it will peter out eventually, while Crimea will be returned to Russia which paid for it with hundreds of thousands of lives when it took the peninsula from the Crimean Tartars and the Turks.
The question arises, though: does this kind of policy really serve Russia’s national interests? If the Kremlin is convinced that it does, then it must act decisively – I repeat, with no regard for the West. After all, the West’s degree of aggressiveness can’t be topped. And if it does not, then the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was a strategic mistake. But first, let us discuss the West.
Is the west the world community? What’s that?
As I mentioned already, the West offers its own interpretation of the analyzed events. For every Russian sneeze, it has a counter-sneeze, especially since the Russians tell no fewer lies than the West. For example, the Russians said that they never crossed the border into Georgia proper; it later turned out that they did (and even occupied Gori). Even after Presidents Medvedev and Sarkozy signed the Principles of settling the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, Russian troops were still stationed in Gori (this was demonstrated by Western correspondents). Item 5 required “moving the Russian Federation’s armed forces back to the line preceding the start of combat action,” yet they remained in South Ossetia – not outside its limits. In response to the Georgians’ “genocide” of the Ossetian people the Russians and the Ossetians performed a no lesser “genocide” of the Georgians living in South Ossetia – so the West claims. (They also remind us in the same breath of the Russian troops’ barbaric deeds in Chechnya.) The claim about the need to protect Russian citizens in South Ossetia is presented as an argument for idiots since it opens up the possibility of aggression against a country whose citizens killed a dozen or couple dozen people on a third country’s territory. For example, should a group of German extremists kill several dozen Americans in Italy, the USA will have the right to attack Germany, and Italy too in the bargain. By the way, when some American students were taken hostage about twenty years ago – in Haiti, I think – America sent there a “limited contingent” of troops who liberated the hostages and replaced the head of state while they were at it. The West’s general motif is the need to help Georgia and rein in Russia.
The heat of anti-Russian passion would have been the same even if Moscow had taken Tbilisi – well, maybe a degree higher, but the sanctions and other punitive measures would have been the same. In general, Russians’ attempts to persuade the West of the legality of their actions, endless interviews granted by Medvedev and Putin to Western mass media, the Colonel General’s press conferences matter not at all. Particularly laughable are the references to the UN, to respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and nations’ right to self-determination. All these principles are mutually contradictory even on the level of international law. One should always remember: when two equal rights collide, force decides; the history of Yugoslavia is an eloquent example. I repeat: no matter what Russia says, practically all the press in Europe and in North America covers this conflict as a manifestation of “Russian gangsterism” (The Economist, 23 August 2008, p. 32). Their main headache is finding a way to suppress Russia without hurting their own interests. Therefore the constant attempts to “prove” Russia’s good intentions and create a “positive” image of Moscow look naïve in the present confrontation. They appear especially dumb when they are managed by “image makers” such as N. Narochnitskaya who spouts absolute nonsense on any issue.
And then, what is the “world community”? It is the “golden billion” headed by the Magnificent Seven bandits who rob the rest of the world. They spit “from the height of the Eiffel tower” themselves on all the principles of the UN or of any other international organization since they know well from their own experience that might is right. All else (law, morals, principles) is for the underdeveloped. Try talking about morals and principles to the oligarchs – those who buy $250,000 dresses for their lovers or “small castles” in Nice for €500,000,000. They will be much surprised. It is the same thing as the Magnificent Seven. They won’t refuse, however, to maintain a “dialogue” with you on this topic; for that purpose, they have their own journalist-“hounds” specially trained for barking (against Russia at present) who are very well paid.
In short, one can pay no attention to the challenging yells coming from the West, since the West itself will keep doing what it did in any turn of events, i.e., “surround” Russia with a string of NATO bases situated in former Soviet republics.
I repeat: one may spit on the “world community’s” reaction from a height no lesser than the Eiffel tower. One may not spit, however, on one’s own national interests. Let us now analyze them not from the regular folks’ perspective, but from the standpoint of science.
What is the essence of Russia’s national interests in the North Caucasus?
Any analyst should have noted that the Russians never once voiced on the official level the essence of their national interests in this region, or, more precisely, in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. “Protection of own citizens” sounds rather incongruous, since citizens’ rights abroad are protected by consulates. “Genocide of the Abkhazian and Ossetian peoples on the part of Georgia?” All of the West, though, has been – and still is – performing such genocide in Africa and even in its own land (the USA vs. the Indians), which never was – and is not now – an excuse for Russia’s military intervention. Not once in the course of its conflict with Georgia has the Kremlin mentioned any geostrategic, economic or political interests. So the question is: for which interests’ sake does Moscow send forth its armed forces, which already lost 80 men killed, according to Putin, and intends to spend a billion dollars on rebuilding a neighboring “state”? If they don’t clearly explain Russia’s foreign policy interest in the North Caucasus to me as a citizen of Russia, how can I support this policy?
There exist certain ABCs of foreign policy which start with explaining foreign policy interests. The essence of the latter is that foreign policy proceeds primarily from economic benefits. All other interests (political and geostrategic) serve specifically the financial interests.
What economic benefits does Russia acquire from having taken the side of South Ossetia and Abkhazia? Granted, Russia does carry on trade with several countries through these territories. However, statistical data show that Russia’s trade with all states of the Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia) is a drop in the bucket; besides, Russia doesn’t need these territories to trade with Azerbaijan. It can likewise bypass them to trade with the trans-Caucasian states of Iran and Turkey, especially since the volumes of trade with these countries are likewise trifling. Russia doesn’t have investments bringing sizable profits in these regions. It is laughable to talk of benefits from trading with these “independent states.” Russia doesn’t trade with any country across the Caucasus. In other words, Russia has no economic interests in this region.
What it does have is economic losses. (I’m not even touching now on the financial cost of the present war, which is undoubtedly substantial.) As mentioned already, Russia intends to spend (that is, take away from its own population) about one billion dollars for rebuilding South Ossetia – on the level of the state, that is. Today many idiots in a position of local authority require Russians to provide monetary “brotherly help” to South Ossetia in a “voluntarily-coerced” manner. All this takes place in conditions when Russia’s own population leads a wretched existence. It suffices to take a look at the countryside which is currently in the state of early feudalism. Thus Russia takes on the obligation to build up the economy of an “independent state” which suffered a calamity. Why not do the same for other independent states which are in even worse predicaments? There are plenty in Africa, for example. Abkhazia is also starting to absorb substantial funds. Is Russia really such a wealthy country that it can shower favors on the entire needy world for free, without any economic benefits to itself?
In the absence of the primary interest – the economic one – all others matter not at all. That’s not the way Russia’s leaders think, though. Some may say that a political interest exists. What is it? It is to have peace on Russia’s borders. It is perfectly apparent, though, that this kind of policy will bring no peace; on the contrary, tensions between all parties to the conflict will only go on increasing. Moreover, the Western press will start promoting the following topic in this connection: Russia has created a precedent, and now it will be possible to recognize some part of Russia’s own territory as an “independent state” should its population declare independence – for example, in the Far East region or in that same North Caucasus. It will only take some diligent work, and I don’t rule out that such work is already underway – in Ingushetia, for example.
There is one more argument in connection with “interests.” It isn’t said out loud, but rather a sort of implied: the geostrategic interest. Allegedly, in the event of Georgia joining NATO that Organization’s troops (a military base) may be put in South Ossetia. This is possible in principle; however, what difference does it make whether the troops are stationed in South Ossetia or in Georgia proper? From the military perspective, this doesn’t matter. In response to the USA or even forestalling it, Russia could put its most modern weaponry on its own territory, on its southernmost border. Where is this weaponry? Did rust eat it?
In other words, there is no economic interest involved in this area of Russia’s foreign policy. Putting it crudely, there’s nothing to defend. At the same time Moscow’s actions have not solved the problems of peace and security; instead, they have only exacerbated these problems.
This type of policy reminds one of the meaningless wars waged by Russia in the Balkans in the second half of the 19th century saving the Bulgarians from the Turks – apparently only for the purpose of having these same Bulgarians already in the 20th century twice make war on Germany’s side against Russia and then against the Soviet Union.
And oh yes, there is one more killer argument: some say that the war was fought out of compassion for the South Ossetian and Abkhazian peoples. This may be Russia’s specificity. General Skobelev noted once that Russia is the only country in the world that indulges in the luxury of fighting wars out of the feeling of compassion. The problem is that it isn’t those who make the decision that goes to war; it is the ordinary people who are sent to their slaughter – most importantly, for purposes that are unclear. I can understand it when newly recognized countries express their readiness to join Russia and become part of its territory – this makes at least some kind of sense: geopolitical, humanitarian. However, sacrificing own soldiers for other countries’ interests is the Russian limitlessness of “humanism.”
On the whole Russia’s current foreign policy repeats the mistakes of both the Tsarist and the Soviet periods when material and human resources were destroyed for the sake of false or mythical interests. This is just one aspect of the problem; there exists another one that is no less important: the law of profitability of foreign policy. For example, the Americans have it officially stated that $1 of expenditures in the sphere of international activity must bring $10 of profit. Deviations from this rule do happen, but what’s important here is the principle. When putting together the foreign policy budget, America’s foreign-policy accountants calculate the effectiveness of expenditures for all parts of the foreign policy potential very thoroughly. Has anyone figured the profitability of foreign policy in Russia? Should someone try, I’m sure that the proportion will be the reverse: for every 10 rubles spent, they are lucky to get back one ruble. Most likely they don’t get even one kopeck back; it all goes down the drain.
Let me remind you of another law of foreign policy: the law of rational proportion between the country’s foreign policy potential (FPP) and its budget. For a regional power, FPP expenditures must be in the range of 10% of the budget (about 20% for a global power). Today’s Russia is a regional power based on its economic potential, yet it spends over 30% of its budget on foreign policy. In other words, the country’s leadership beggars its own population, as the USSR leadership used to do earlier. Being ignorant of the laws of foreign policy, the Kremlin is dooming Russia to strategic defeat.
There is one more important factor – perhaps the single most important one. Russia is a capitalist state, albeit with its own specificity. That is, it doesn’t differ as a state in the social-economic system sense (ideological, economic, political) from the USA or from the Magnificent Seven countries in general; they are all one family, so to say. Russia’s Stabilization Fund is in the USA, Russia’s oligarchs are in London and in Nice, Russia’s gas is in Europe. In other words, social-economic interdependency simply won’t let Moscow conduct a consistent policy even toward Georgia, to say nothing of Ukraine which is likewise raring to join NATO. This means that after today’s “victories” in the North Caucasus we should expect Russia’s gradual retreat with massive economic losses.
Finally, there is a need to take a look at this conflict and at foreign policy in general from class positions. The system Russia has is capitalist: the bourgeoisie is at the top, headed by its oligarchs (altogether 5-7% of the population); at the bottom are the hired workers and the public sector workers (scientists, teachers, physicians, public servants, the military, etc.) who are likewise hired hands, only in the service of the capitalist state. The interests of those who are at the top and at the bottom by definition cannot coincide in principle, and that includes foreign policy interests. I, who am at the bottom, are not a whiff whether Russia is a great power or not, what relations it has with this or that particular country, etc. What’s important to me is that I can’t make ends meet, that I get practically no health care, that I can’t afford to have my children educated in schools and in higher schools. Most of those who live in the countryside suffer from the lack of infrastructure – roads, communications, electricity; people exist there like in feudal times. All this takes place while the fat ones at the top can afford things like paying the pop star Alla Pugacheva $100,000 to perform one song for an eight-year-old girl or buying yachts costing between 230 and 500 million dollars. The Russian state belongs to them today, and Russia’s foreign policy in the international arena answers to the interests of this top stratum whom the Kremlin and the government serve. Therefore the war against Georgia likewise serves the interests of this bunch which personifies the state-oligarchic capitalist system. To one who is at the bottom not only does this war give nothing – it takes away from me by taking funds from the state budget and by forcing me to help a foreign state. I won’t dwell on this topic here; I only want to state that: a) Russia is a capitalist state; b) its foreign policy meets the interests of the ruling class; and c) it contradicts the interests of the vast majority of the Russian people.
Rosland’s actions
Russia’s foreign policy can truly reflect the real interests of the people in one event only: if the entire current System is replaced with modern socialism. That future state, called Rosland, will be inhabited by “Roslyane”[1], or “Rosslians” (people of Rossiya, or Russia).
In this concrete case, Rosland’s foreign policy in the North Caucasus would be built in the following way. Firstly, at the forming stage a referendum would be held among all the ethnic enclaves of the North Caucasus with the question being: do you want to stay in Rosland or not? The population would be informed beforehand that should it express the desire to stay, all these territories would be subject to the laws of Rosland; no local “laws” based on feudal customs (polygamy, blood vengeance, etc.) will be allowed. After the referendum, those willing to stay will be allowed to do so, while the rest will be cut off by the state border. That part of the “unwilling” territory’s population which voted for joining Rosland will be allowed to immigrate to Rosland’s land and acquire full citizenship once they vow to obey the laws of the state unequivocally.
Relations with the “non-willing” territories should be built as with independent states – based on friendship, naturally. This approach makes it possible to resolve rather easily any international or inter-ethnic conflicts. Should South Ossetia and Abkhazia request to join Rosland after they have proclaimed independence, they can only be accepted after a thorough analysis of Rosland’s actual possibilities for absorbing these enclaves (meaning calculation of the economic strain they put on the country). Should the estimates show that the country is not prepared economically to accept these independent states in the fold, it is best not to admit them, so as not to worsen the economic situation of Rosland’s own population. Relations between South Ossetia and Abkhazia, on the one hand, and Rosland, on the other side, will then be built on an inter-state basis, and help, if needed, will be provided in the same way it is offered to any foreign state struck by calamity or an unforeseen crisis. That is, the format of relations will be a different one.
Rosland will categorically avoid being drawn into the conflicts between the North Caucasus peoples since it will never be possible to determine which ones are in the right and which are in the wrong. (I remember that at the height of the Karabakh conflict I found myself by chance in Baku and then a week later in Yerevan. Each side tried to prove “convincingly” that it was in the right.)
On the whole, Rosland should conduct a passive policy concerning the North Caucasus, including Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia, due to the absence of real interests in this region. Rosland’s strategy will be extremely active, however, concerning Ukraine, from which Crimea will have to be taken. (This is what the current Russian administration should be busying itself with.) Subsequently, the task will be to reunite at least the Russian-speaking part of Ukraine’s territory with Rosland, i.e., former Russia.
Rosland will ignore the West’s reaction, whatever it may be, since, I repeat, the West, or the so-called “world community” in the face of its leaders, is a collection of illiterate idle talkers who became confused in the vectors of historical development. They ceased to understand “where the front is and where the back is”; this is why their activity is dedicated to preserving the imperialist system which has become historically obsolete. They are allies of the law of entropy growth, i.e., the law of death. There is no need to consult such as them, or to heed their opinion; they are to be ignored or to be destroyed merely if they are too importune. The progress of mankind’s development will only accelerate as a result. At least that’s what the Roslyane in Rosland will be thinking.
Alex Battler (Oleg Arin)
03.09.2008
[1] Wordplay: roslyane = those who grow
Russian-Georgian conflict: victory or defeat?